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Government lacks a substantial interest.
No substantial interest is advanced or "directly linked." . . . .
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Plaintiff fair housing councils claim that they are entitled to summary
judgment in their favor because defendant Roommate.com, LLC (,'Roommate,,),
through its Internet-based roommate search service, Roommates.com
("Roommates.com" or "the Site"), "makes several unlawful inquiries into the
personal characteristics of all persons looking for a place to live" and "makes and
publishes discriminatory statements that indicate preferences based on race,
religion, national origin, gender, familial status, age, sexual orientation, source of
income, and disability, all in violation of fair housing laws." plaintifß, however,
ignore the law and mischaractenze the facts.
First, plaintiffs make their claims against Roommate in total disregard of an
unambiguous federal statute, the Communications Decency Act of 1996,47
U.S.C- $ 230 ("CDA"), which immunizes interactive computer services from
publisher liabilify for statements made by third parties. If plaintifß have any
claim here, it must be made against hose who authored the preferential
statements, not Roommate.
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Second, plaintiffs' attack rests on an unconstitutional interpretation of the
federal Fair Housing Act, 42 u.s.c. g 360a(c) ("FHA"), and the state Fair
Employment and Housing Act, cal. Govt. code $ 12955(c) ("FEHA"). plaintiffs
seek to impose liability for speech because of disfavored content. plaintifß seek
to restrict speech about lawful activities--the preferential selection of roommates --
even though the government lacks any compelling or substantial interest hat
might justi$i such controls. Further, the speech restriction sought by plaintiffs -- a
prohibition on all preferential speech -- goes far beyond that which is necessary to
achieve any government interest.
Third, plaintifß attempt o saddle defendant with liability by claiming it is a
"property manager" or "in the business of selling or renting dwellings." This
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contention is made with no legal authority whatsoever, and no basis in fact.
Roommate is merely a forum for speech among adults seeking compatible living
parürers, and represents no one in the management of rental properties or any
transaction involving the sale or rental of homes.
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Plaintiffs claims all fail under the law. They are barred by CDA and the
First Amendment. Accordingly, plaintifß' motion for summary judgment must be
denied, and Roommate's motion for suïnmary judgment should be granted.
II.
BACKGROT]ND
Roommate incorporates by reference Roommate's Mernorandum of points
and Authorities in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, including the
factual matters stated there, in Section II. Roommate also offl¡rs as evidence in
opposition to plaintifß'motion the previously filed Declararion of Bryan peters
filed in support of Roommates'Motion, as well as the Supþi;mental Declarations
of Timothy L. Alger and Bryan Peters, filed concurrently, along with all of their
supporting exhibits.
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Plaintiffs make the broad statement that "g 360a@) and g 12955(c)apply to
all housing including rooms for rent and shared living quarters," but plaintiffs fail
to cite a single case supporting the application of these statutes to statements
regarding roommates or a search service for roommates uch as Roommates.com.t
04177/601848.4
' For example, in Fair Housing Congress v. Weber, cited bv plaintiffs on page
10 of their memorandum, former tenants (as well as fair housing associations)
sued an apartment landlord and manager for discrimination against families with
(continued...)
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Plaintiffs further argue that the decisions in@ an¿
Ragin v. New York Times establish that section 3604(c) applies to publishers of
discriminatory statements originally made by third parties. (Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
"Pls' Mem." at 10.) Plaintiffs, however, make this statement in complete disregard
of the CDA. Nowhere do plaintiffs acknowledge that there might be a distinction
between newspapers and Internet website operators or service providers. Nor do
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I (...continued)
children in the rental of aparlments in an apartment complex. SeeWeber, gg3 F.Supp. 1286,1288 (C.D. Cal. 1997). The plaintiffs in thát case alleged rhat rulesfor conduct around the swimming pool and common areas unfairlyìargeted
children and thus families with children. See id. at l}g0-g2. No shareã livingquarters were at issue in Weber
Similarly, United States v. Hunter and Ragin v. New york Times, involvedlawsuits against newspapers for publishing advertisernents that exþessed racialpreferences in the rental or sale of apartments and houses. ^See Hr¡nter ,45g F.Zd205, 209-10 (4th cir. I 972);Ragin, gz3 F.2a995, 99g-1000 çzacn. l99l). No
shared living quarters were at issue in Hunter or Ragin. Finaùy, Housing RightsCenter v. The Donald Sterling Comoration arose from accusations of
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discrimination against a landlord/properfy manager by tenants and prospective
tenants in its buildings. See Donald Sterling,274 F. Supp 2d,lng: niZ-lS (C.D.
cat.2003). Again, no shared living quarters were at issue.
Plaintiffs also cite a journal article authored by Robert Schwemm.
'Conveniently, plaintiffs cite to a discrete portion of the Schwemm article thatpurportedly supports their position, while failing to admit that elsewhere in the
article Schwemm supports defendant by expressing concern that 3604(c) is
unconstitutional as applied to speech about lawful discrimin atory conduct, and theprovision might not survive the R.A.v. case. ^ see Robert G. Sclrwerrun,
"Discriminatory Housing statements and $ 360a(c),,, 29 Fordham urb. L.J. lg7,280-82 (acknowledging insuffîcient "fit" between the FHA's purpose and section360a(c) where the underlyrng activity is exempt from other fUa provisions), Zg7-289 (expressing concern that section 3604(c), as a regulation of sieech, not
conduct, does not survive R.A.V.). Plaintiffs also fail to disclos.ìhut Schwemm
does not even discuss roommates or shared living quarters in his article.
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plaintiffs acknowledge that this distinction was of such importance to Congress
that it led to the passage of the CDA.
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A. Interactive comnuter services Are Not subject To Liabilitv Fo.
With the passage of the CDA, Congress immunized all interactive computer
services from publisher liability arising fr9. content supplied by third parties.
The CDA states: "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shal be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider." 47 U.S.C. $ 230(c)(1). An "interactive compurer
service" is "any information service [or] system . . . that provides or enables
computer access by multiple users to a computer seryer., Id. $ 230(Ð(2).
By withdrawing interactive services from republication liability, Congress
sought o ovem¡le Strafton Oakmont. Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co. , lgg5 WL 323710
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (in which Prodigy was found liable as a "publisher" of false
information posted by the user of a financial bulletin board), while encouraging
open discourse on the Internet. see 47 u.s.c. $ 230(bX D, e) ("It is the policy of
the United States . . . to promote the continued development of the Internet and
other interactive computer services and other interactive media [and] to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet anà other
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation,). See
Batzel v. Smith,333 F.3d 1018, 1026-29 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,1245. Cr.
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2812 (2004) (discussing the origin and goals of section 230).
Section 230 ptecludes liability wherever the complained-of content is posted
by third parties and publication is an element of the plaintiffs claim. The provision
"overrides the traditional treatment of publishers, distributors, and speakers under
statutory and common law." Batzel,333 F.3d at 1026; accordcarafano v.
Metrosplash.cor4. Inc. ,339 F.3d I 1 19, rr2z-25 (9th cir. 2003). "(Jnder g 230(c),
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' ' ' so long as a third pafty willingly provides the essential published content, the
interactive computer service receives full immunity regardless of the specific
editing or selection process." Carafano ,33gF.3d at I I 24; seealso Elumenthal v.
Drudge, 992 F . supp. 44, 49 (D.D.c. l99g) ("In view of this statutory language,
plaintiffs argument hat the íl'ashington Post would be liable if it had done what
AoL did here . . , has been rendered irrelevant by congress.").
The courts have consistently interpreted the CDA with Congress'express
goals in rnind, while recognizing the impossible burden that would be imposed if
interactive services were required to screen and control users'postings. See Zeran
v. America online. Inc. 129 F.3d327 ,330-31 (4rh cir. t9g7) (quoted by Ninrh
circuit with approval in carafano , 339 F.3d at 1123-24), cert. denied, 524 u.s. g37
(1998); accordBatzel,333 F.3d at 1027-28 ("Making interactive computer services
and their users liable for the speech of third parties would severely restrict the 
riinformation available on the Internet. Section 230 therefore sought o prevent .
lawsuits from shutting down websites and other services on the Internet.").
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CDA.
The immunity of section 230(c)(1) applies to every fype of information
service "that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
seryer . . .' 47 U.S.C. $ 230(Ð(2). This broad sweep includes interactive websites
such as Roommates.com. Through the Internet, many thousands of users are able to
access and use a searchable database on Roommate's computer servers. (Response
to Plaintifß' Separate Statement ("RpSS") T,ll 53-63.) See Carafano v.
Meffosolash.com. Inc. , 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1065-66 (c.D. cal. 2002), affd, 33g
F.3d 1 1 19 (9th cir. 2003); Gentr:v . eBa)¡. Inc. , 99 cal. App. 4rh g l6, g3 | n.7 , l2l
Cal. Rptr.2d703 (2002); Schneider v. Amazon.pom. Inc. 3l p.3d 37, 40 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2001); see also B.r Eou, w.instrin *d co., hc.u.Am..icu onlir., Inc.,
206F.3d 980, 983, 985 (1Oth cir. 2000), cert. denied,53l u.s. gz4 (2000)
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($ 230(c) applied to searchable database of third-parfy stock quotes); Batzel, 333
F.3d at 1030 & n.l5 (rejecting argument that g 230(c) applied only to Internet
service providers)).3
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Further, plaintifß seek to impose liability on Roommate as a publisher.
(First Amended complaint "FAC" nn rc42,43, 52; pls. Mem. at 14-15.) section
230(c) "precludes courts from entertaining clairns that would place a computer
service provider in a publisher's role." Zeran, I2g F.3d,at 330. The publisher,s role
includes the decisions "to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content." Id.
Claims of all kinds that seek to impose liability for failure to remove a third -party
posting are barred . See Schneider, 31 P.3d at 464 (CDA extends to all civil claims
involving publisher liability for third-partycontent); Carafano ,33gF.3d at ll13,
ll25 (dismissing defamation, invasion of privacy, and negligence claims); Noah v.
AOL Time Warner. Inc. ,261F. Supp. 2d 532 (8.D. Ya.2003) (dismissing civil
rights claim under cDA), affd,2004 wL 60271 I (4th cir. 2004).
Regardless of how they dress their claims in their Memorandum, ptaintiffs
are seeking to recover from Roommate for the publication of third-party content.
Plaintiffs complain about the preferences expressedby users; no claim is made as to
\n"å
1 9
20
2 l
pny expression of preference by Roommate. The choices made and the language
used in creating a profile -- indeed, the decision to post anything on
Roommates.com -- is made by third parties, and does not involve any authorship by
23
24
25
26
27
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04177t60184i:.4
Roommate. See Gentry, 99 Cal. App. 4that 834 (representations on auction
website were made by users; categonzation and compilation of postings did not
abrogate immunify).
Moreover, Roommate is not an "information content provider" in respect o
the statements hat are the subject of this lawsuit. Plaintiffs seek to impose liabilify
on the notion that Roommate creates content with its questionnaire (FAC !f l l-13;
Pls. Mem . at 4.5, Il-lz),but the Ninth Circuit has already rejected this theory. The
collection, formatting, and manipulation of information does not t¡ansform
1
2
3
4
statements made by a third party into content created by the service. Carafano ,33g
F'3d at ll24-25. The Ninth Circuit in Carafano approved the use of standardized
answers that can be readily searched on a database; many services such as
Roommate would be cumbersome or unusable if they simply provided a ,,blank
slate" for users, without consistent data and search terms. see id.5
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The Ninth Circuit also made clear in Carafano that the fact that an interactive
computer service provides some content on its site does not abrogate the immunity:
". . . [T]he statute precludes treatment as a publisher or speaker for,,any
information provided by another information content provider.,, Id. at ll25
(quoting G.{rtty, 99 CaI. App. 4th at 833 n.ll); accord Novak v. Overture Servs.,
Inc., 309 F. supp. 2d 446,452-53 (E.D.N.Y.2004). Roommare indicares no
preference and excludes no adult from its service. Rather, the preferences (if any)
are of Roommate's users.
This lawsuit is about the statements of third parties in a forum Cesigned
merely to facilitate the matching of compatible living partners It is the users who
create the profiles and select he information in the profiles. Roommate is not the
"content provider" of the complained-of statements, and is tfrerefore immune from
any liabilify for those statements.
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Plaintiffs' Mischaracterizations of Roommate's Functions Do Not Take
Plaintifß contend that defendant is doing three things that violate the fair
housing laws: (1) defendant is demanding prohibited screening disclosures from
renters; (2) defendant ¿'s causing its members who have places available to rent to
make many of these statements; and (3) defendant ¿'s allowing the publishing of
numerous tatements that show blatant preferences. (Pls. Mem. at I l.) plaintiffs,
however, wholly misstate Roommate's role in formatting ancf arranginginformation
provided by its members
04177t60t848.4
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By portraying Roommate's actions as "screening the renters,, and ,,forcing the
renter to answer a lot of questions about themselves before they can become a
member" (Pls' Mem. at l2), plaintifß attempt to label Roommate as a properry
manager (which it is not, as discussed below) and the author of the information
provided by its members so the CDA's immunity for information provided by third
parties does not apply.
What plaintifß call screening, however, is really the personal profile process
that all members of Roommates.com ust complete, whether they are seeking
roommates or have a place for a roommate. (Defendant's Memorandum of points
and Authorities in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment "Defs. Mem.,, at 2-
7
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9
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4; RPSS T 1164.) As discussed in Roommate's rnoving papers, all members
complete a personal profile to allow the computer to match roommates with specific
search criteria provided by other members. (Defs. Mem. at Z-4;Rpss T T 64.)
While members eeking roommates complete questions regarding their gender,'
sexual orientation, pets, cleanliness etc., members with places available answeï
similar questions regarding their households. (Defs. Mem at 2-4; Rpss tTtT 65-69.)
No one, however, is denied access to Roommates.com on the basis of his or her
answers to these questions. Any subsequent culling down or selection based on
gender, sexual orientation, pets, cleanliness etc., is done by members of
1 8
I 9
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Roommates.com who later may, but do not have /o, select roommate preferences
before the computer provides matches. (The default on the preference pages is no
preference.)And,h'@sbyusersseekingroommatesisperfectly
lawful, as plaintiff must concede. (RPSS 1T 95) (Deposition of Diana Bruno --
Rough Transcript) ("Bruno Tr.") at 126:6-128:8) þeople who live together may
make their choice of roommates based on discriminatory factors). Any person who
chooses to make roommate selections based on the information collected in the
questionnaire has a right to do so, for such actions are embodied in the substantive
04t77/601848.4
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due process right of intimate association, as discussed below and in Roommate,s
Motion at Section V(B)(2)(a).
Plaintiffs also claim that Roommate forces persons who have a place
available to rent to select and make discriminatory statements. Here, plaintiffs
simply misstate the facts by portraying the selection of criteria for matching
roommates as mandatory. In fact, the user completing a member profile is not
required to exhibit preferences and the default for all questions on the "My
Roommate Preferences" pages of Roommates.com for both those seeking
roommates and those providing rooms is no preference. (Defs. Mem. at 2-3;RpSS
llT 64, 66-69.)
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Finally, plaintiffs claim that Roommate allows the publishing (or, indeed,
publishes itself) statements about tace,religion, color, and national origin. As
noted in Roomnute's Motion, at no point in the personal profile questionnaire or
membership rocess are users prompted for information regarding race, religioú,
color, or national origin. (Defs. Mem. atZ-4;RPSS ,1T I 70.) some users do use the
"Additional Comments" pages to include additional information about themselves
or their residence in the "Additional Comments" section of the questionnaire, which
may be viewed as part of the user's profile by paying members. As discussed above
and in the moving papers, Site users provide such information, not Roommate, and
these users are responsible for all content they upload or post. Roommate does not
prompt discriminatory statements in the "Additional Comments," and it rdoes not
review or edit the text of users'profiles. The comments of users are part of a true
"open forum.l' (Deß. Mem. at2-4; RPSS T tT 71.)
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Section 230(e) provides that "No cause of action may be brought and no
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this
section." 47 u.s.c. $ 230(e)(3). Exempted are federal criminal statures,
intellectual properfy law, state laws that are consistent withsection 230, and,the
04177t601848.4
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Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. 47 U.S.C. g 230(e)(l)-(a). The
FHA is not among this list of exemptions.
Plaintiffs argue that nothing in the CDA or in the cases interpreting the CDA
shows that Congress intended for it to trump the fair housing laws. (pls. Mem at
16.) In support of this proposition, plaintiffs rely solely on a note by a law student.2
Plaintiffs further contend that Congress's ilence "suggests Congress did not intend
for the fair advertising mandates to be abrogated." (Pls. Mem. at 16.) plaintifß'
reasoning is erroneous and disregards a fundamental tenet of statutory
interpretation: Where Congress explicitly enumerates exceptions in the text of the
statute, additional exceptions are not to be implied in the absence of contrarv
legislative intent. See Noah,26l F. Supp. 2d at 532.
Plaintiffs also assert, with no legal authority whatsoever, that the CDA
"immunizes websites for tort liability in obscenity and defamation cases,, (pls. ?ú
Mem. at 16) and it can thus co-exist with the much broader "Fair Housing Act
which creates liabilify and protection for and from certain civil rights violations."
(Pls. Mem. at 16-17.) The many CDA cases cited in the moving papers establish
that the immunity reaches all claims other than those expressly exempted. Indeed,
it is not even a close call here, where "publication" is an express element of a claim
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under section 3406(c) and section 12955(c).
Finally, plaintiffs conclude that even if there would be immunify under the
CDA from the fair housing laws, such immunity does not apply in this case because
Roommates.com is a "crucial intermediary" in a housing transaction. Plaintiffs base
this conclusion on the fact that a "person looking for a place to live must pay to be a
member and get matched with a landlord." (pls. Mem. at l7).
2 See Note, Jennifer C. Chang, In Search of Fair Housing in Cyberspace: The
Implications of the Communications Decency Act for Fair Housing on the
Intemet, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 969, 100l (2002). The author posits u nãoo* view of
"publisher" liability that has been rejected by every federal court, both before and
after the publication of the article.
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This is nonsense. Both those who are looking for places to live, and those
who have homes to share, can use a wide variety of means to find each other.
Roommates.com is just one of many such websites, and people are free to
communicate by newspaper, local advertising circular, word of mouth, ând notices
posted on bulletin boards at work, school, place of worship, or the local grocery
store. Roommate has nothing to do with any transaction; it is not a real estate agent
with an exclusive listing, and it is not an owner or property manager. It merely
provides a forum for people to communicate about a common interest (shared
homes), and is no different from countless other interactive websites that enable
people to find dates, pets. old school chums, distant relatives, or fellow fans of
Elvis or Beanie Babies.
Roommate is immune from liabilify under the CDA, and plaintiffs' summary
judgment motion must be denied.
PLAINTIF'FS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGiTIENT MUST
BE DENIED BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED
BY THE F'IRST AMENDMENT
Plaintiffs'claims also are barred by the First Amendment o the United States
Constitution because they seek to impose liability under statutes that regulate
speech on the basis of content and viewpoint. MoreoveÍ, even if the postings on
Roommates.com are considered commercial speech (and they are not), plaintiffs'
claims do not meet the requirements of Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm.,447 U.S. 557 (1980), and they are invalid for that reason as well.
A. Plaintiffs'Interpretation of FHA and FEHA Is Unconstitutional
The FHA makes it unlawful to publish "any notice, statement, or
advertisement, with respect o the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any
preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
- 1 l -
IV.
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handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such
preference, limitation, or discrimination." 42 U.S.C. g 360a(c) (emphasis added).
The FEHA has a nearly identical provision, with the additional categories of
"sexual orientation," marital status," ancestry; and "disability." Cal. Govt. Code
$ 12955(c).3
During the 36 years since the FHA was enacted, the United States Supreme
Court has developed exacting standards by which any regulation of speech must be
judged. "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or
its content." Police Dept. of the CityolChicago v. Mosley,408 U.S.92, 95 (1972)
(striking down ordinance prohibiting demonstrations near schools except peaceful
labor picketing); seealso R.A.v. v. City of st. Paul, 505 u.s. 377, 3Bz (1992);
Boos v. 8arry,485 U.S. 312,319-21 (1988); Smolla & Nirnmer on Freedom of
Speech (2004) $ 3:3 ("When the government's purpose is di:;agreement with the
message, the regulation is obviously content-based.").
The Supreme Court applies "strict scrutiny" to content-based speech
regulations, and this analysis inevitably leads to a finding cI unconstitutionality.
,See Simon & Schuster. Inc. v. Membe.rs of the New York State Crime Victims
Board, 502 U.S. 1,05,120-21 ( 991); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service
Comm., 447 U.5.530, 536 (1980). That must be the result here, as well. The
3 Plaintiffs'ctraims alleging violation of the Unruh Civil R-ights Act, violation
of Business & Professions Code $ 17200, and for negligence fail for the same
reasons as the FHA and FEHA, because they also seek to impose liability for
speech based on content. Plaintiffs offer no factual basis for these claims that is
different than their FHA and FEHA claims. The Unruh Act, section 17200, and
negligence claims also fail because, if they are somehow interpreted to reach
speech relating to housing, they are void for vagueness. It is impossible to know
what statements are permitted or not permitted. See Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union,52l U.S. 844, 874,884-85 (1997); Board of'Airport Comm'rs v.
Jews for Jesus. Inc.,482 U.S. 569, 576 (1987).
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govemment does not have a compelling interest in controlling speech relating to the
search for and selection of roommates. Individuals have the right to freely select
those with whom they choose to live. (See section IV(BX1), infra.) T1ne
interpretation urged by plaintiffs merely interferes withthe exercise of that right.
Any assertion by plaintifß that there is a compelling interest in restricting offensive
speech or speech that perpetuates stereotypes (i.e., an interest hat justifîes
restricting speech that is separate from the discriminatory selection of roommates)
also fails. The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that "in the public debate our
citizens must tolerate insulting, even outrageous, speech . . . . A'dignity'
standard . . . is so inherently subjective that it would be inconsistent with 'our
longstanding refusal to punish speech because the speech in question may have an
adverse motional impact on the audience."' Boos,485 U.S. at322. Moreover,
even if the government had some interest, such as restricting offensive speech,
, RIe6h6LTdrWni\s("Tki, ¡arrowly tailored to achieve rhat
interest; as interpreted by plaintifß, the provisions prohibit a broad sweep of
protected speech, including the private, one-on-one communications of thosew^rkconsidering rooming together.
The Constitution's rejection of content-based regulations extends even to
categories of speech that can be forbidden altogether. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380
(striking down hate-speech statute because it was limited to certain subject matter,
including race and religion). Sections 360a@) and 12955(c) undoubtedly evince a
"special hostility towards the particular biases . . . singled out." Id. at 395. Neither
forbids a statement indicating a preference to rent or sell to Democrats, senior
citizens, pet owners, college students, cigarette smokers, or those who are gainfully
employed. Even if it is assumed for argument's ake that the govemmental interest
here is diversity in housing, that interest may be advanced by alternatives that do
not run afoul of the First Amendment. Here, the FHA and the FEIIA silence certain
disfavored categories of speech, while leaving all other preferential speech about
_13 -
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housing unrestricted. This violates the Constitution, even where the government
has good intentions.a See Texas v. Johnsoq,4gr U.S. 397, 4l4,4lg (19g9).
B.
TheY Are. the Restrictions Urged by Plaintiffs Are Unconstitutional
The postings on Roommates.com do not merely "propose a commercial
transaction," resulting in reduced protection under the First Amendment's
commercial speech doctrine. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Netrvork, Inc. ,5O7
U.S. 410, 423 (1993); see also Riley v. National Fed. of the Blind,4B7 U.S. 781,
795-96 (1988) (speech with commercial aspects is still fully protected where
intertwined with informative speech). The right to post cn the cite is free. (RpSS 1l
T 58, 86.) Although users indicate a desire to share the expenses of a residence,
those costs aÍe a, small fraction of the information in a Roommates.com posting.
Users describe themselves, their interests, their characteristics (messy, clean), their
schedules, ffid the homes they hope to share. (RPSS 1164-70) If economic motive
was the sole reason for the postings, users would not be interested in disclosing all
this personal information to others. Users are looking for people with whom they
can comfortably and safely share living quarters.
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a See Brown v. California Dept. of Transportation,32l F.3d 1217,1223-25(9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting policy that allows display of flags along srate highways
and forbidding all other signs and banners); see a/so Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale,
530 U.S. 640,667 (2000) (approving Boy Scouts'exclusion of homosexuals under
right of expressive association; the law "is not free to interfere with speech for no
better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored
one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the govemment"); Collin v.
26
27
28
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Smith, 578 F .2d ll97 , 1,205-06 (7th Cir. lg78) (striking down ordinance
restricting march by Nationalist Socialist Party of America in heavily Jewish
communify; "That the effective exercise of First Amendment rights may undercut
a given government's policy on some issue is, indeed, one of the purposes of those
rights. No distinction is constitutionally admissible that turns on the intrinsicjustice of the particular policy in issue." (emphasis added)).
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Indeed, the preferences expressed in the profiles run counter to the users,
economic interests, because they limit the potential matches. This simply is not a
case of "I will sell you X at the Y price." Virginia State Board of pharmacv v.
virginia citizens consumer council. Inc. ,425 u.s. 74g, 762 (1976); see also
Bigelow v. Virginia,42l U.S. 809, 818 (1975) ("The existence of 'commercial
activity, in itself is no justification for narrowing the protection of expression
secured by the First Amendmeflt."'); compare Pittsburgh Presq Co. v. pittsburgh
comm. on Human Relations,4l3 u.s. 376, 3s5 (1 973) (gender-based
advertisements were "no more than a proposal ofpossible employment").
In any event, the restrictions urged by plaintiffs are unconstitrrtional even
under the commercial speech doctrine. In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court
formulated a four-part analysis for determining whether a regulation of commercial
speech passes constitutional muster. First, the court must determine as a thresh$d
matter whether the commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment -- i.e.,
whether the commercial speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.
Second, the court must determine whether the government has a substantial interest
in regulating the expression. Third, the court must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest. Fourth, the court must
determine whether the regulation is no more extensive than necessary to serve the
governmental interest. See Central Hudson,447 U.S. at 566. The interpretation of
the FHA and the FEHA urged by plaintiffs fails even the intermediate scrutinv of
W
Central Hudson.
1. The nostings do not involve illegaI activity.
Selection of roommates is protected by the substantive due process right of
intimate association, which permits people to freely choose those with whom they
live and socialize. ,see Lawrence v. Texas,539 u.s. 558, 123 s. ct. z47z (2003)
(striking down a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to
engage in certain sexual conduct); Moore v. Ciqv of East Cleveland,43l U.S. 494
04t77t601848.4
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(1977) (striking down a city ordinance that restricted which relatives qualified as
"family" under the housing code).
This right of intimate association includes the right to exclude. Although it
rejected the Jaycees'claim that they were exempt from a state nondiscrimination
statute, the Supreme court in Roberts v. united States Jaycees ,46g u.s. 609
(1984), recognized that adults may select (or exclude) other adults in highly
personal relationships without government interf,erence. "[F]reedom of association
receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberfy., Id. at 618-19.
Such relationships involve the "distinctively personal aspects of one's life. . . .
[T]hey are distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of
selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from
others in critical aspects of the relationship.,, Id. at 620.s
It is beyond dispute that roommate relationships meet these criteria, and
people are entitled to create a household without govemment interference. These
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are relationships of two, three, or four people who choose to share kitchen,
bathroom, and living areas not just for economic reasons, but also because they
have compatible lifestyles. The postings on Roommates.com clearly involve lawful
activity.
Additionally, the FHA and FEHA \ryere never intended to control roommate
selection. First, the plain language of the FHA indicates that Congress intended the
prohibition against discrimination to apply to the typical landlord-tenant
relationship and the sale of real property, and not to the selection of someone who
s The California Constitution also recognizes aright of privacy that includes
the right to share living quarters with any other person without interference by thegovernment. See California Const., Art. I, $ 1; City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson,
27 Cal.3d 123,164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980) (reversing preliminary injunction againsi
residents who violated zoning statute on the grounds that the stafuti timitingihe
04177/601848.4
number of unrelated persons in a single-family house improperly abridged the
right to privacy); accord
Santa Monica, 88 cal. App. 4th45l, 105 cal. Rptr.2dg02 (2001).
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will share one's intimate living space. Although they have been on the books for
decades, Roommate has not found any reported court decision applyrng section
3a06@) or section 12955(c) to speech relating to the selection of roommates.'
Second, the goal of the FHA is to eliminate discrimination in housing and to
5 ll promote diverse communiri.r. ttutfi.*tr u. t.oqoolirun tift tnr. Co., 409 U.S.[ -
6ll20s,2rr 0972);
2d 644,652 (6th Cir. 1991). Suppressing the speech of those who wish to share
their homes does not further this purpose. Many people become roommates o they
can live in a residence or cornmunity that they could not afford if they lived alone.
Making such cohabitation more diffîcult burdens the efforts of members of
historically repressed groups to associate and perpetuates homogeneity in the more
9
1 0
t 1
12 ll desirable locales.
la ll include roommate selection within the FHA. The "Mrs. Mu,phy exemption,,
15 llnrovides that if a dwelling has four or fewer units and the own lr lives in one of the
Third, the "Mrs. Murphy exemption" suggests that Cgngress did not intend to
16 ll units, the owner is exempt from the FHA's non-discrimination provisio ns. 42
17 ll U.S.C. $ 3603(b). The policy underlying the exemption is, ri'anything, more
l8 ll applicable to a roommate situation. The selection of a person to share one,s own
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6 The Washington State Attorney General addressed an anti-discrimination
similar to the FHA and the FEHA, and concluded that it is lawful for ,,a person
discriminate on the basis of sex, age or religion in selecting a roornmate with
whom to share living quarters, or for a person to speci$r in an advertisement for a
roommate that the roommate must be of a particular sex, age or religion, or for a
newspaper to publish an advertisement for a roommate when the adiertisement
contains uch specification." 1976 Op. Wash. A.G. !7, at l, 1976 WL 16g50l.
"'One of the societal values which is deserving of recognition, in our view, is thebasic freedom to control one's life by choosing the sex of persons with whom onelives."' Id. at 4-5. The Attorney General went on to conclude ihat "since the
conduct advertised is legal so also, logically, should the advertì:ìement itself be."Id. at9.
943 F.
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living quaxters must be one of the most intimate, personal decisions one can make,
and is more deserving of protection than the right to select your neighbors. 7
2 ' .
Because preferential roommate selection is lawful, the government does not
have a substantial interest in controlling speech about it. SeeTexas v. Johnson ,4gI
u.s. 397, 412,4r8 (1989); R.A.v., 505 u.s. at 414 (white, J., concurring); see also
Robert G. Schwemm, "Discriminatory Housing Statements and $ 360a(c) :' zg
Fordham Urb. L.J. 187,287-289 (expressing concern that section 3604(c), as a
regulation of speech, not conduct, does not survive R.A.v.).
)
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Punishing publication of preferential roornmate postings does not directly
advance, and is not "directly linked" to any governmental interest. Even if it
assumed that the government's interest in regulating speech about roommate
selection is fostering diversity, muzzling speech does not directly advance that'
interest, because, as stated above, it actually impedes economic upward movement
and diversity and there certainly is no evidence that it results, actually, in diverse
communities. While it makes sense to conclude-that nondiscrimination i  housing
sales leads to more diverse neighborhoods, it does not follow that restrictions on
roommate advertising does, particularly given the fact that people can lawfully
make roommate selections based on preferences. The necessary "frt" under Central
Hudson is lacking where the regulation impedes the flow of truthful. lawful
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information because government paternalistically fears the impact on recipients.
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773; Linmark Assocs. v. Township
of willingboro,43l u.s. 85, 96-97 (1977); see also Schwemm , st¿pra,29 Fordham
04177/601848.4
7 The right of individuals to exclude when selecting roommates distinguishes
this case from Ragin v. New York Times Co.,g23F.2dgg' (zd,Cir. l99l). There,
the court found that the preferential advertising was unprotected speech because it
related to illegal activity in the sale and rental of homes . Id. at tooz-o¡.
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Urb' I-.J. at280'82 (acknowledging insufficient "fit!'between the FHA,5 p.opose
and section 3604(c) where the underlying activity is exempt from other FHA
provisions).
4.
Sections 360a@) and 12955(c) go far beyond what is necessary to serve any
substantial governmental interest. They impede a broad sweep of protected speech:
The statutes are not limited to public advertisements; they reach any ,,notice,, or
"statement," and this necessarily includes the thousands of "roommail,,
communications among Roommate.com's users. Indeed, Roommate's ervers now
9
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hold 1.3 million messages. (RPSS 
"lT 60.) What plaintiffs want to do is turn
-Roommate and other interactive computer services into "the government,s
policemeninenforcingsection3604(c). ' '@,g43F.2d,at653.
"If the First Amendment means anything, it means that regulating speech
must be a last -- not first -- resort." 
, 535
U'S' 357, 372 (2002). Where the government can "achieve its interests in a manner
that . . . restricts less speech, the Government must do so." Id. at37l. Here, the
governmental interest in ensuring access to housing for protected classes is1 8
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adequately achieved by enforcing the provisions of the FHA and the FEHA that
prohibit discrimination. Othçr alternatives include educational advertising, and the
govemment and fair housing organizations certainly may offer thrr 
"*r 
placement
services for those whom they believe are disadvantaged in the housing market.
In sum, then, the interpretation of the FHA and FEHA urged by plaintiffs is
unconstitutional s a content-based regulation of speech. Plaintiffs'claims also fail
under even the more relaxed commercial speech doctrine, because they seek to
impose an unjustified, excessive regulation of speech about lawful mafters.
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Despite the obvious fact that Roommate merely operates a roommate search
website, plaintiffs attempt to circumvent he imrnunity provided by the CDA by
arguing that Roommate is acting as a'þroperty manager who screens persons based
on age, sexual orientation, familial status, and gender.,,8 (pls. Mem. at lz.)
Plaintiffs even go so far as to claim that Roommate is subject to independent
liabilify because it is "in the business of selling or renting dwellings." (pls. Mem.
at l2-13.) Plaintiffs are incorrect on both accounts.
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According to plaintifß, Roommate is a properfy manager because it provides
its users with a "so-called'lifestyle'questionnaire [which is] a type of screenirg*,
service provided by properfy managers." (plaintiffs' undisputed Fact 10.)
Plaintiffs provide no authorify for this definition save for the declaration of their
own witness, Diana Bruno, who offers no foundation for this claim. plaintiffs'
apparent contention that Roommate is a properfy manager ignores the common
understanding of "property manager" as a person or entity actively involved in the
operations of some sort of building or other real properfy. See Reference Book - A
Real Estate Guide, Ch. 24 at 506-07 (California Dept. of Real Estate 2000),
avai Iable at http : I / www. dre. ca. gov/reftoc. htm (Rp s s 1[ g 7 ) .n
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8 Plaintiffs likely try to force Roommate's actions under this rubric, in part, in
an attempt to benefit from the holding of Donald sterling corp. in which
defendant properfy manager was preliminarily enjoined fro* ãsking tenants their
national origin or place of birth on an application for a garageremote control
device. ,See Donald Sterling Corp. ,274 F. Supp 2d, at ll4l-43. It is noteworthv
that Donald sterling corp. does not even mention the cDA.
e In a section entitled, "specific Duties of the Properly Manager,,' the reference
(continued...)
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Moreover, plaintifß'o\ryn declarant, Ms. Bruno, acknowledged at deposition
that Roommate is not a properry manager. (Rpss !f 96 (Bruno Tr. at 135:7-9.) (a.
"Is it the contention of the Fair Housing Council that roommates.com is a properfy
manager?" A. "No. That is not my contention.").) Plaintiffs have used her
declaration out of context to support an argument hat she does not endorse.
In any event, no amount of argument by plaintifß can turn Roommate into
something it is not. Roommate is a family run business that operates a website
8 ff with computer servers in Mesa, Anzona. (Rpss I 53-61.) No Roommate
9lf emnloyee visits the rooms, apartments, or homes described in postings by users on
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e (...continued)
book lists the following duties a properfy manager must perform. None of them
are performed by Roommate. (RPSS TlT 94, 9g.)
l. Establish the rental schedule that will bring the highest yield consistent withgood economics.
2. Merchandise the space and collect the rent.
3. create and supervise maintenance schedules and repairs.
4. rf applicable, insure independent contractor status.
5. Set up payroll system for all employees.
6. Develop a tenant/resident relations policy.
7. supervise employees and develop employee policies, including an Injury
Prevention Plan.
8. Maintain proper records and make regular reports to the owner.
9. Qualify and investigate a prospective tenant's credit.
10. Prepare and execute leases.
1 1. obtain decorating specifications and secure estimates.
12. Hire, instruct, and maintain satisfactory persoïmel to staff the building(s).
13. Audit andpay bills.
14. Advertise and publicize vacancies through selected media and broker lists.
15' Recommend alterations and modernization as the market dictates.
1 6. Inspect vacant space frequently.
17. Keep abreast of the times and competitive market conditions.
18. Obtain and pay insurance premiums and taxes.
19. Be knowledgeable about and comply with applicable Federal, State and locallaws.
Id. at 506-07.
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Roommates.com. (RPSS'll 87.) No Roommate employee speaks with Site users to
discuss the operations of the building where the members live. (Rpss llgg.)
Roommate does not have a financial interest in real property owned by users of its
Site' (RPSS tl 8.9.) Roommate is not employed by landlords or users of its Site to
manage buildings or houses (or screen prospective tenants for that matter). (RpSS
11 90.) Roommate does not screen the postings of any user, whether the user is
offering to share a home or looking for a home to share. (RPSS tT 91.) Roommate
is not involved in any decisionmaking by any person regarding postings on the site
or regarding the sharing of homes. (RPSS 11g2.) Roommate is not involved in the
sale or rental of dwellings. (RpSS fl 93.)
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Plaintifß make much of the fact that Roommate I'takes membership money.,,
(Pls. Mem at 11.) But plaintiffs ignore several crucial facts: (l) Roommates.com
users may use the site without paing; (2) some users choose ro pay to upgrade
their memberships o that they can take advantage of more ; dvanced fe4ture of'the
site; (3) users who do pay "membership money" are paying,',:t fbr properry
management services, as plaintifß allege, but for time on the service. (RpSS I g4.)
Paid membership in Roommates.com is similar to having a subscription to a
newspaper. Roommate is no more a property manager than is the Los Angeles
Times.
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B. Roommate Is Not "In the Businêss of Selling or Renting Dwellings"
In a last-ditch effort to impose liabilit¡i on Roommate, plaintiffs argue that
Roommate is "in the business of selling or renting dwellings," but Roommate does
not even fit within plaintiffs'own definition of that phrase. plaintiff relies on the
Fair Housing Act's definition of "þeing] in the business of selling or renting
dwellings," which requires that Roommate "participate[] as an agent" in certain real
estate transactions. 42 U.S.C. $ 3603(c) Plaintifß fail to def,rne arealestate agent
or to provide any reason why Roommate qualifies as an agent. (pls. Mem. at 13.)
04t77t601848.4
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This omission is revealing. In fact, California law excludes from the
definition of real estate agent a person who merely provides listings of housing
available for rent. See 
,93 Cal.App. 3d 696,
701-03, 155 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1979) (requiring real estate agent license to sell circular
of apartment listings was overbroad regulation of commercial speech in violation of
First Amendment). Anderson held that a real estate agent license cannot be
required to sell a circular of apartment listings. It follows that apartywho merely
engages in that activity is not a real estate agent. Accordingly, Roommate is not
acting as a real estate agent and it is not "in the business of selling or renting
dwellings."
YI.
CONCLUSION
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For the forgoing reasons, Roommate respectfutly requests that the Court
grarú sulrìm¿ry judgment in its favor, and dismiss the action in its entirefy.
DATED: August 27,2004
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
I am employed rn the county of Los Angeles, State of Califomia. I am over the age of lg and
not a party to the within action; my business address is: 865 S. Figueroa Street, loth Ftoor] Los Angeles,California 90017.
On August 27,2004, I served the foregoing document(s) described as: DEFENDANTTS
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON thEinterested party(ies) in this action by placing a true copy thereofenclosed in a sealed envelope, addressed
as follows:
Gary W. Rhoades
Law Offices of Gary W, Rhoades
834 l/2 S. Mansfield Ave.
Los Angeles, CA 90036
Telephone: (323) 937-7095; Fax: (775) 640-2274
PROOF OF SERVICE
l0l3A(3) CCP Revised 5/l/88
X
*I deposited such envelope in the mail at
The envelope was mailed withpostage thm
I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing
correspondence for mailing. It is deposited with U.S. postal seryice on thãt same day
with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California in the ordinuryou.." ofbusiness. I am aware that on motion of the parfy served, service is presumed invalid ifpostal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one daylfter date of deposit
for mailing in affidavit.
-X- BY PERSONAI SERVICE I caused to be delivered such envelope by hand to the offìces of the
addressee.
BY MAIL
BY TELECOPIER By transmitting the above listed document(s) to the fax number(s) set forth onthis date.
BY FEDERAL EXPRESS byplacing the document(s) listed above in such envelope for
deposit with FEDERAL E)GRESS to be delivered via priority overnight service to thepersons at the addresses et forth above.
Executed on August 27,2004, at Los Angeles, California.
(State) I declare under penalty of pery'ury under the laws of the State of California that the
above is true and correct.
(Federal) I declare that I am employed in the offrce of a member of the bar of this court at
whose direction the service was rnade.
X
DAVID CLARK
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